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IPSUS
"At a later period after Antigonus had
been killed
in battle and those who had taken his life had begun
to oppress and tyrannise over their subjects a peasant
in Phrygia who was digging on his farm was asked by
a passer-by what he was doing and replied 'I am
searching for Antigonus'" (1)
Before the advent of Alexander the world of both Hellene and 'barbarian' had, for almost two centuries, conformed to a stable general pattern. On the marches between these two worlds there might be changes, disputes over the control of Aegean cities or national revolts in Egypt, but in the main Hellenic society clung to the narrow confines of mainland Greece, the islands and the extreme edge of the Asian land-mass whilst the Persians ruled the vast heartland of Anatolia, Mesopotamia and Iran. Each felt the need to frequently meddle in the domestic squabbles of the other but not since Xerxes had either civilisation tried to completely overthrow the other. Alexander's conquests had ruptured this pattern completely, but he had not lived long enough to establish a new one to take its place. After the two decades of bloody and destructive strife that followed his demise it seemed at last as if a new design had emerged. Antigonus was established in Anatolia and the Levant, Ptolemy held Egypt, Seleucus was monarch of inner Asia while between them Cassander and Lysimachus ruled the European provinces of Greater Macedonia that Philip had created.
In fact, it was not to be; the incurable bellicosity of the first Hellenistic monarchs would smash this arrangement almost as soon as it was established and another twenty years and the trauma of a brutal invasion from central Europe would be needed before the kaleidoscopic picture of the Hellenistic world finally settled into place. The events that threw into confusion these new found kingdoms were some of the most dramatic of ancient history. Four of the kings would come to battle in the heart of modern day Turkey in an epic conflict, where the number of combatants would assume almost twentieth century proportions. One would lead a march that makes Hannibal's journey from Spain to Italy pale into insignificance and huge armies would co-ordinate their movements from starting points thousands of miles apart with no more sophisticated means of communication than messengers on horseback.
The principal catalyst of these events was Antigonid aggression. Failures in Egypt and Rhodes had offered some consolation but still the other Diadochi were convinced they intended to unify the Macedonian empire under their rule. As the last decade of the fourth century ran down it was Cassander who was directly threatened. In Demetrius' first foray into mainland Greece the ruler of Macedon had seen his dominant position there undermined, but on his second visit the young king seemed set to attack Macedonia itself.
Initially, Cassander attempted to diffuse the impending deluge by diplomacy. He outfitted an embassy that travelled all the way to Syria only to find "Antigonus replied that he recognised only one basis for settlement -Cassander's surrender of whatever he possessed, "(2).
With war the only alternative, early in 302, Cassander
invited Lysimachus to visit him at the Macedonian capital Pella.
Co-operation and friendship had been the keynote between the two
rulers for some years but this new situation was to bring a
qualitative strengthening of their relationship. Lysimachus had
no illusions that, if Demetrius overthrew Cassander, a reckoning
with him would not be long in coming. From this moment on, these
kings in Europe would act as one against their common enemy,
combining their armies and resources for a fight to the death.
Pella, where the alliance was cemented, was a greater more
palatial capital than the one the king of Thrace knew when he had
left Macedonia in the service of Alexander the Great thirty years
earlier. The city Philip had made the political fulcrum of the
Greek world had been much embellished by the wealth of the East
channelled back by returning veterans and it showed in the
artistic and architectural creations Greek artists had
constructed. In these rich and cultured surroundings the two
kings seemed light years removed from the rough Macedonian barons
that Philip had yoked to his purpose but essentially their
motivation was little different. They intended to retain and if
possible expand what they saw as their personal holdings and, if
their struggle was now writ large across half the known world,
their concerns were much the same as their ancestors. When they
made sacrifice and read the omens for the future of their
enterprise they had no illusions about the magnitude of the task.
Both had for years been part of a loose and sometimes ruptured
coalition with Ptolemy and Seleucus but this time they knew that
they must directly involve these powers in an assault on
Antigonus. Close friends of the kings were despatched as envoys
to the court of Ptolemy in Egypt and to Seleucus in the heart of
Asia.
It would be some months before Cassander and Lysimachus knew the results of these embassies but in the meantime they could between them mobilise a formidable army. Lysimachus ruled over a people who could provide peltasts and aristocratic cavalrymen in abundance and his links with the Greek settlements alongside the Aegean, Black Sea and Propontic coasts assured him of a useful supply of mercenaries. He only lacked first class Macedonian phalangites but Cassander could fill this gap.
Many thousands of these formidable pikemen were seconded to the king of Thrace under the command of Cassander's imaginative and capable diplomat and general Prepelaus. The kings' strategy was partly dictated by geography and partly by the present threat of Demetrius. Cassander would march south to hold off Demetrius with the remainder of his forces whilst Lysimachus and Prepelaus would invade Asia and take the vital Aegean cities from Antigonus. Then, with support from the armies of Seleucus and Ptolemy they could force a decisive battle on Antigonus in his own backyard. The old warrior would then have to recall Demetrius from Greece. It was a high risk strategy and though Cassander was not to be present at the final denouement it was clearly he who was staking most on the outcome. By denuding Macedonia of Prepelaus' troops he was putting himself in severe danger from the rampant Demetrius. Not only would he need all his skill on the defensive but he was dependent on Lysimachus making quick and decisive inroads into Asia.
This was the first time that Lysimachus had taken the offensive against Antigonus and actually invaded the Asiatic side of the Hellespont. While he had been wined and dined by Cassander in Pella his agents had been preparing the way. The citizenry of the towns along the Asiatic shore had been lobbied and bribed to good effect. Lampsacus and Parium opened their gates to his soldiers and their co-operation proved vital in ensuring an uncontested crossing of the army from Europe.
Lysimachus was a cautious commander and a headlong march to find and fight Antigonus would not have been in his nature, even allowing for the fact that on the latest information his quarry was hundreds of miles away in Syria. He took the decision to employ his temporary military ascendancy to secure those Hellespontine provinces that abutted directly on to his own kingdom. Not all the communities in the region had been as amenable to his approaches as Lampsacus. Some were far from inclined to swap a distant association with the Antigonids for the rule of a king whose capital was just over the water in the Thracian Chersonese. And, others chose resistance within that age old tradition of civic rivalry that meant they automatically took the opposite cause to that of their local enemies. One such was Sigeum, lying at the very mouth of the Hellespont, its possession was important for control of the straits, especially for Lysimachus who did not possess a powerful fleet. The defences were stormed and the inhabitants saddled with a garrison.
At Abydos, the blandishments of Lysimachus' agents had again
not been successful but he was reluctant to leave it unconquered
in his rear. He settled down to a regular siege as the defences
were such that it would be costly and difficult to overcome by
direct assault. Engineers and armourers busied themselves in
making towers and siege engines whilst soldiers dug the trench
lines in preparation for an attack. Unfortunately, for Lysimachus,
the
disparity of naval power between the coalition and the Antigonids
now had its effect. Demetrius sent a fleet with reinforcements
for the beleaguered city and Lysimachus could only helplessly
watch as supplies and men were disembarked at the quays of Abydos'
port.
The example of Abydos though was not contagious, the rest of Hellespontine Phrygia eventually submitted through intimidation or in hope of advancement from the new power in the region. The factor of an unconquered Abydos began to assume less importance as Lysimachus looked south to make further conquests. Here his way had been well prepared by Prepelaus who, from the beginning, had been acting separately in Aeolia and Ionia. Cassander's general had achieved much, Adramyttium had opened its gates to him and Ephesus, the venerable port and fortress of Ionia, had succumbed to the threat of devastation. In the town they discovered the hundred hostages that the Rhodians had handed over to Demetrius after the epic siege of their city. The island republic was always worth ingratiating and Prepelaus sent them home with words of comfort. He also burnt the entire Ephesian fleet in an attempt to deny reinforcements to the Demetrian navy, which was sailing down from Abydos. Teos and Colophon, smaller places to the north west of Ephesus, also chose not to resist Prepelaus but further up the Ionian peninsular, near the shores opposite Chios, he was unable to prevent an Antigonid fleet landing. Here, the cities of Erythrae and Clazomenae were reinforced and whilst Prepelaus plundered the countryside around he could not spare the time to attack them.
Despite these minor setbacks, Prepelaus marched inland against the main administrative centre of Antigonus' west Anatolian provinces. Sardis, once the capital of Croesus' Lydia, was a formidable fortress built in rugged country on the edge of the Anatolian plateau where nature aided man-made defences against those who wished to possess the riches of this ancient treasure house. The Macedonian marched his men from the coast up the valley of the Hermus for several days before he sighted the walls where still today dilapidated Greek and Roman ruins straggle for many miles over the rocky country. He did not need to pit his valuable warriors against these stern defences for he had been in communication with the garrison commander, Phoenix, who had been persuaded to open the gates for a price and an assured future under a new master.
Phoenix was, indeed, a survivor, a native of Tenedos and a friend of Eumenes. He had led part of the cavalry in the epic battle against Craterus near the Hellespont and further distinguished himself by thwarting an attempt at desertion by a large part of Eumenes' army in 319. He switched allegiance to Antigonus after Gabene and ended up governor of Hellespontine Phrygia. Ptolemaeus, in the revolt against his uncle in 308, had subverted Phoenix but even when the rebellion had been crushed he had managed to maintain some position under Antigonus. But though a traitor had allowed Prepelaus access to the city he could not take the acropolis. Here, the officer in command was Philip another old stager but one with an even more illustrious past. He had been on all of Alexander's great campaigns though his deeds are obscured in the mists of time. Even so, he was senior enough to be rewarded with the satrapy of Bactria and Sogdia at Babylon. Like Phoenix, he had fought alongside Eumenes at Gabene and Paraetacene before changing sides to the victorious Antigonus. Serving as a counsellor to Demetrius in the Gaza campaign he had never wavered in his new loyalty to the Antigonids and now, in the twilight of his career, showed no desire to sell the pass. (3)
Lysimachus, informed of his ally's successes in the south, determined to utilise what was left of the season. He aimed to establish himself in the highlands of central Anatolia before the foul winter weather of this inhospitable mountain region made further campaigning impossible. His objective was the city of Synnada in the south west of Phrygia. Synnada, another of Antigonus' royal treasuries, was not far from Apamea Celaenae, the site of Antigonus' old satrapal capital in the days of Alexander. Lysimachus' army had a long and arduous march to reach its destination, following one of the river valleys that led up to the central plateau before reaching the main section of their journey of more than a hundred miles. The landscape was mostly open steppe with peasant villages and few towns or settlements that Greeks would have recognised as such. Once again, when they eventually reached Synnada treason had smoothed the way.
Docimus is another of those fascinating but shadowy characters the history of this period so often throws up. Although not recorded under Alexander, he emerges as satrap of Babylonia in 320. Sent to displace the incumbent Archon-who Perdiccas suspected of duplicity-Docimus successfully ousted him but the death of his mentor in Egypt meant he had little time to enjoy the fruits of his labour. Deciding that to hold Babylon was impossible, he threw in his lot with the other fugitive Perdiccans Alcetas, Attalus and Polemon and fled to Pisidia. Crushed by Antigonus in 319 Docimus was imprisoned in a mountain fortress with Attalus and Polemon. These three, with only five fellow prisoners, like some ancient 'wild bunch' overcame the garrison of 400 left to guard them and took control of the fort. Undecided whether to flee or stay put and wait for Eumenes, it soon became academic as they found themselves under siege by an Antigonid force. Now Docimus took a decisive hand, learning that Stratonice(Antigonus' wife)was nearby he sent an envoy to her hoping to 'arrange an escape'. In the event, Docimus left the fort, whereupon he was promptly arrested while the unfortunate Attalus and Polemon underwent a siege lasting 16 months before totally disappearing from history.
As at least one modern commentator has pointed out, this whole episode is very unconvincing (4). Docimus had fallen out with his colleagues and sold them down the river. A fact made clear when despite the appearance of being arrested he returned to prominence as an Antigonid commander during the campaign of 313 helping in the 'liberation' of Miletus. And, here in 302 we find him holding a post of some significance in southern Phrygia for Antigonus. Given his pedigree, it comes as no surprise that he once more turned traitor and betrayed Synnada and other fortified treasuries in the area to Lysimachus. (5)
It had so far been a year of considerable success for the coalition commanders; local divisions and the conveniently treacherous inclinations of so many of Antigonus' commanders had eased their path to a point where they controlled very large areas of Antigonus' Anatolian possessions. Nor was it just men directly confronted by enemy armies that deserted Antigonus' cause. Mithridates, the client princeling of the region lying about Myrlea -later famous as Apamea-denied his overlord and threw in his lot with the coalition, though he gained little but an early death from his change of allegiance. (6)
The behaviour of these turncoats was perhaps extreme but it seems there was a general failure of nerve in the Antigonid administration. Which may bear out a possible truth about Antigonus' personality. "By nature imperious and disdainful of others and as overbearing in his words as in his actions"(7). On occasions his rough handling of the feelings of his own followers built up a real reservoir of disgruntled officers who only awaited the right opportunity to turn on him.
Lysimachus, not unreasonably, expected a period of respite before the Antigonid main army arrived from Syria. Antigonus was now eighty and the invasion cannot have been anticipated. So Lysimachus came in for an unpleasant surprise when messengers conveyed the astounding news that the man, himself, was not far away and marching at great pace with a massive army determined to bring on a battle.
When the events of 302 had begun to unfold, Antigonus’ court was enjoying the fruits of security and prosperity in the new capital Antigonia. A tithe on the commerce of west Asia and the eastern Mediterranean, that the city's central position allowed, was more than sufficient to fund the prestige projects conceived by the king and his friends to breathe life into their new foundation. Patronage of sporting and artistic activities has been through the ages as much to do with personal and national prestige as with entertainment and never more so than in this era. And, Antigonus had set in motion a competition to be held at Antigonia where the number and quality of the participants was meant to bear comparison with the great and ancient festivals of Greece.
Sportsmen and artists from the whole of the Hellenic world had been attracted by generous prizes and most of them were already in the city billeted in inns or the homes of friends when the news arrived of Lysimachus' invasion. It was with great reluctance the old man realised he must cancel the event and once more take the field in person. Generosity was an important quality for a civilised ruler and his guests, if they could not perform, must not be allowed to depart empty handed. 200 talents in total was laid out to compensate the redundant contestants who received invitations to return when the present crisis had been resolved.
Once the decision was forced on him Antigonus showed all his old energy, the resting giant had been stirred and was now prepared to vent his anger on those who had disturbed his retirement. The field army was concentrated in camps around Antigonia; most would have been looking forward to attending the festival, so little time was lost in preparing for the long march to the north west. Syria was left behind and the army moved first to Tarsus in Cilicia where final preparations were made. The army received three months pay from the camp treasury and from Alexander's old depository at Cyinda and Antigonus also took 3,000 talents for expenses for the upcoming campaign. The army marched on the age old route through the Cilician Gates and then crossed the Taurus before they could bivouac in Cappadocia. All along the route his garrisons and local peoples were forced to reaffirm their loyalty, now he was amongst them. They crossed Lycaonia and Phrygia where travellers and agents from the west began to bring him up to date news of Lysimachus' movements. He knew his enemy had taken Synnada but the latest word placed him 40 or so miles east of Dorylaeum encamped in the rolling plains of the Anatolian plateau. Winter was threatening but Antigonus determined to strike immediately marching his men at top speed after his prey.
When the coalition leaders realised that Antigonus was, at best, only a couple of days march distant they called a full council to decide on their response to the threat. They were exposed, certainly outnumbered and a defeat here in the interior of Anatolia could be disastrous with hundreds of miles back to friendly country. The strategy decided upon was to neutralise Antigonus' numerical superiority by digging strong entrenchments, refusing battle and attempting to gradually withdraw north in an effort to rendezvous with Seleucus. Palisades and ditches were quickly dug as they awaited the enemy. Antigonus arrived, drew up his army and offered battle but when this was refused deployed his men to deny the coalition access to forage or supplies. Lysimachus was all too well aware of the exposed situation of his army's encampment and when night fell marched them off over 40 miles to a place near Dorylaeum where he would be able to better defend himself. Here, he built a solid triple palisaded entrenchment on some convenient hills which were watered by a nearby river and had access to supplies from the city itself. Antigonus, frustrated, soon set off after them and when he found their second camp he ordered his men to completely invest the place so that they should not escape again.
Lysimachus saw with concern preparation for what looked like a regular siege. Antigonus' men were not only throwing up earthworks but his engineers were constructing siege engines and setting up ballistas and catapults. The besieged sent out light troops to disrupt this work, but "in every case Antigonus had the better of it"(8) and his men protected by their trenches had the edge in these exchanges of missile fire. The long march from Syria had not diminished the energies of the Antigonid veterans and with the enemy skirmishers driven off, each day they were able to bring their siege-lines a little closer to the ramparts of the camp. Soon Lysimachus' men were being hit at close range by the arrows and spears of the besieging light infantry as well as bolts and stones from the artillery.
This battling amidst the trenches is reminiscent of Roman warfare. The Roman legions were famous for their spadework whether it was against national enemies at Numantia or Alesia or in civil strife when Caesar fought Pompey at Dyrrhachium and Anthony and Octavius battled Brutus and Cassius at Philippi. Hellenic armies were less noted for this tedious but effective tactic and it is reported that Pyrrhus was the first general to systematically encamp his armies in regular defences. But this campaign shows that the sophisticated use of earthworks as a battlefield stratagem was well known and understood by these extraordinary military men who had learned their trade under Philip and Alexander.
Lysimachus was able to just about hold his own for a few weeks but his position ultimately depended on supplies holding out until Antigonus was forced by the weather to give up the contest. The old king's siege-lines were drawing so tight that the besieged could hardly obtain any supplies from outside. Food began to run short and the besieging army showed no signs of quitting their post. Famine and enemy harassment looked likely to turn what had begun as such a successful campaign into a disaster. Lysimachus and his allied captains decided the only chance of survival lay in extricating themselves once more and moving further north. They knew that this would be a far riskier proposition than on the previous occasion and made preparations accordingly. There was still one part of the camp where Antigonus had not yet been able to completely encircle them but even so they would still need special conditions to cover the retreat. Their ramparts were well guarded until the moment of escape, partly to deceive the enemy into believing that they had determined to defend until the end and partly to ensure no deserters were able to alert Antigonus to Lysimachus' intentions. A stormy night provided perfect cover for the deception, when driving rain forced Antigonus' pickets into shelter and made visibility extremely poor.
The bedraggled warriors somehow slipped out without alerting the guarding army and managed to put a few miles between themselves and their foe by the time dawn exposed the empty camp and the ruse. Antigonus organised pursuit immediately sending his cavalry on ahead. This must have reminded the old warrior of his days of glory when he had chased the wily Eumenes across the plateau of Iran before he brought him to decisive battle. The gap between Lysimachus' rearguard and Antigonus' van was gradually diminishing and in the flat steppe country they were crossing no obvious defensive positions were available to hold off pursuit. Lysimachus was a worried man when Antigonus' army drew level and marched parallel only waiting for the most suitable site to bring on the battle. But the time of the year was against Antigonus and as Lysimachus had banked on, the elements came to his rescue. The night storm that had covered his escape had been the harbinger of winter rains and these suddenly arrived in full force. The tracks of both armies soon became seas of mud. Pack animals began to founder and horses and men found each step an effort of will. Antigonus realised he could not manoeuvre his battalions in this morass, to bring his enemy to battle was impossible and to continue the chase would cause losses from exposure and desertion.
The two kings had been sparring across the Anatolian plateau for weeks but no decision had been reached and now both looked for winter quarters. Lysimachus kept marching north, he had a long journey before his men could disperse in security in the friendly environment of Bithynia. Antigonus, disappointed, turned south and returned to Phrygia and his old capital Celaenae Apamea. Here, an administration that had been familiar with his ways for three decades could maintain the army and help plan a strategy for the following year.
It was during this dramatic contest with Lysimachus that Antigonus first received word that Seleucus was on the march from the east to join the enemy coalition ranged against him. The fact of Seleucus' imminent arrival was hard to believe and only a number of impeccable sources eventually convinced him it must be true. When the envoys of the European kings had found Seleucus' court, in 302, he was deep in the eastern half of his dominions. He may have been on the borders of India with the 500 war elephants gifted to him by the Indian king Chandragupta as part of their peace pact. They found a monarch who was extremely receptive to their suggestions. His eastern marches were temporarily settled which allowed him to use his considerable power elsewhere. To persuade him to deploy it against Antigonus was not difficult; he had been in bloody conflict with the man only a few years previously in Babylonia and still had much to fear from a triumphant power based in Syria, whose veteran army might at any time descend down the Euphrates or Tigris into the heart of his kingdom.
Even so, the decision Seleucus took when the envoys had explained their mission was one of the most remarkable strategic gambles ever taken in that era or any other. He was prepared to risk everything on a desperate enterprise against Antigonus. If it failed the dangers to his own position would be immense. But, by the same coin, if it succeeded the demise of the Antigonid empire in the west would open up exciting possibilities. The cautious approach would have been to nibble at the old king's Levantine positions while he was involved in defending Asia Minor but this would have been to throw away the chance to face and finally defeat Antigonid power on almost equal terms. Seleucus might command first class cavalry and numerous elephants but he did not have access to veteran Macedonian and Greek infantry. If he combined with Cassander and Lysimachus this paucity of front line infantry would be rectified and make a crushing victory in the field a real prospect.
To understand the daring of the choice he made it must be realised what a vacuum of intelligence he operated in. The news he had of events in the west was already many weeks old and by the time he reached the scene a whole campaigning season would have passed and the decisive battle possibly already fought. Little is known of his march from the highlands of Iran to join his allies in Anatolia but were it documented it would undoubtedly hold a place as one of the greatest feats of the ancient world. Seleucus took with him 480 elephants, 100 scythed chariots as well as 12,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry over a huge distance. From the rugged hills and deserts of Iran, over the high mountains of Armenia the country he had to cover was consistently wild and dangerous, often peopled by tribes who had never bent their knee to the great king of Persia or even Alexander. A journey of over 2,000 miles and at an inopportune time of the year with winter approaching. Elephants had completed the journey from India to the west before; Craterus had brought many with his veterans, but this had been over several years and they had been able to take an easier way. These animals had traversed the well travelled route up the rivers of Mesopotamia to Syria, through Cilicia and over the Taurus; an itinerary not available to Seleucus because of Antigonid garrisons holding the lands west of the Euphrates.
It was a travel weary army that eventually appeared in Cappadocia; Seleucus had ensured against serious erosion of his strength by making steady but slow progress and it was already late in the season when he arrived. He heard from his agents that Lysimachus had found winter quarters near Heraclea, on the Black Sea, and he adjusted the line of his march accordingly. He led his footsore band into the Salonian plain near modern Bolu where the majority of his allies were bivouacked and gave orders to his relieved followers to finally halt and build the huts where they could recuperate over what was left of the winter. Seleucus and Lysimachus had not met since those dark days at Babylon over twenty years ago. Then, they had been minor players in the drama, now they were main protagonists. They would have had much to reminisce about but even more to plan and for Seleucus there was the satisfaction that his great gamble had paid off and he had arrived in time. (9)
The officers and men were able to depend on a friendly environment here on the temperate coast of Northern Asia Minor. Heraclea was the most important place in the region, a port city that had grown fat on the local trade in corn and mineral ores. Well defended with a small but efficient fleet, ruled by Amestris, the widow of Dionysius, the former tyrant (10). She had an interesting past, a niece of Darius, himself, she had been married to Craterus at the Susa weddings but had been put aside when he allied himself to Antipater and married Phila. She had then wed Dionysius and made herself regent for his children and ruled Heraclea ever since his death. A powerful widow of her aristocratic lineage did not lack for suitors and one such was Lysimachus eager to further his ambitions in the Pontic region. They had recently married and now the dividends of this domestic arrangement became abundantly clear.
Apart from ensuring a friendly port to supply the allied army the amenities of the ruler's court offered the kinds of pleasures that the kings and their officers had not enjoyed in the last season of hard marching and fighting. But, if the well born hobnobbed in the palaces of the city and the ordinary soldiers took their relaxation with camp followers or local women attracted by the glamour of free-spending foreign warriors, it was not a time of totally unalloyed pleasure. News arrived that a considerable setback had occurred in the west.
The confirmation of Seleucus' arrival had shaken Antigonus to the core and for the first time he was convinced of the potentially fatal threat posed by the coalition of his enemies. In this war every Antigonid spear and sword was needed in Anatolia and messengers were sent to Demetrius that he hurry to his father's side. For the second time in his career, Demetrius had been forced to leave a promising campaign in Greece at his fathers behest. His navy had been involved in Asia earlier in the year when they reinforced some allied cities but this had not caused any slowing down on the main front in Greece. But, now the best of his army had to be shipped out with all the warships he could muster. As he looked back over his shoulder, it was only ramshackle arrangements with Greek allies that would sustain his cause once the Antigonid army left and he can have had little confidence that the army of the league he had created would hold together without him. The best hope was to quickly aid his father to victory in Asia and return west before all he had created crumbled away.
Demetrius' Asian landfall was Ephesus from where he had set out on his first great enterprise of Greece in 307. He bullied the Ephesians into returning to their former allegiance and gave terms to Prepelaus' garrison to save a protracted siege. The garrison left while Demetrius replaced them with his own troops to ensure a safe base for the fleet while he took the road north. At breakneck speed the army marched up the coastal route towards Hellespontine Phrygia. If he could regain control there it would threaten the enemies lines of communication and deny them reinforcements from Thrace and Macedonia. The army was kept light and supplied from the fleet cruising along the coast.
Almost the mere fact of the arrival of the army on the Hellespont reversed Lysimachus' first triumphs in the area. Parium was retaken easily, though Demetrius needed to defeat an enemy detachment posted nearby Lampsacus to secure that city. And, while overrunning the Illyrian Autariatae, who made up most of the enemy force, he took their baggage which would have some consequence for the future. A lightning strike had secured one of the major crossing points to Asia but Demetrius intended to close off the other route too, thus driving a complete wedge between Cassander and Lysimachus. As it was not far to the Bosphorus he still had time to reach there before winter weather set in. Once he reached the straits on the Chalcedonian side of the water he constructed a strong camp. 3,000 infantry were left to man it and 30 warships to patrol the crossing points and the adjacent waters of the Black sea. With the season ended the rest of his forces were billeted on the Hellespont and amongst the cities along the sea of Marmara.
When Cassander was sure that Demetrius had left Greece and gone to help the family cause in Anatolia he released more of his men to reinforce Lysimachus. He, as usual, stayed in Europe and sent his brother Pleistarchus in command. This son of Antipater had inherited his father's and brother's ambition but little of their talent. Cassander had several heirs and clearly Pleistarchus stood little chance of gaining the throne of Macedon. Asia Minor beckoned as a chance to carve out a realm for himself.
There could be no doubting Cassander's commitment to the coalition as the force entrusted to his brother was a formidable one. 12,000 infantry and 500 horse; a large section of what remained of the Macedonian army. With the enemy commanding the seas, they would have to take the overland route through Thrace. It was a long march but at least it was familiar territory and they could expect a welcome in Lysimachus' kingdom. A greater problem was where to cross over to Asia as, at least for a short period, they would have to trust themselves to the water. The Hellespont was too well held by Demetrius and it seems probable the intention was to cross further north near Byzantium, a longer journey but one that would allow them to disembark not far from Heraclea. The whole operation shows a remarkable degree of co-ordinated planning between the two armies and presumably Lysimachus was able to communicate with Pleistarchus with the help of the Heraclean navy. But on nearing the Black Sea coast off Thrace it became plain the Bosphorus was also closed off by Demetrius' men. Agents from the Propontic cities informed Pleistarchus of the large garrison left to guard the strait and that Demetrius' fleet was patrolling the coast. Diodorus' account of the subsequent events is somewhat difficult to follow, in exact detail, but the outline is clear enough. Pleistarchus, blocked at both the main crossing points now endeavoured to ferry his men by sea along the Black Sea coast. His point of departure was Odessus(Odessa), which is somewhat strange as this city is over a hundred miles north of Byzantium up the coast towards Scythia. Why he needed to move so far away is not clear as there is no suggestion that Demetrius was preparing to attack him. Perhaps the most likely explanation is that this was the nearest port where shipping was available to transport his army. Pleistarchus needed a considerable fleet and he had not brought one with him and Odessus had the added advantage that news of preparations made there would take a long while reaching their enemies' notice.
The transports that could be gathered in Odessus were insufficient to get the army to Heraclea in one journey and Pleistarchus decided to risk the long crossing in detachments. The first arrived safely but the second was not so lucky. They hugged the coast south, as the previous group had done, but this time when they passed close by the Euxine mouth of the Bosphorus the guard ships were on the alert and Demetrius' superior navy captured almost all the boats and soldiers on board. Pleistarchus, undaunted, obtained more ships and embarked the last units of his army. The commander, himself, was with 500 of his men on a six but most of the rest of the flotilla were not large warships and certainly incapable of facing the patrolling enemy in open battle. Because of this they kept well off the coast to avoid them; a risky procedure now that winter had almost arrived. The armada was especially vulnerable far out at sea when a tempest struck. They were devastated. Only a couple of vessels limped into Heraclea, the rest were sunk and Pleistarchus' flagship went down with only 33 men surviving. Cassander's brother, at least, had the good fortune to be one of these, though it could have seemed little enough compensation when he was cast ashore more dead than alive with the barest remnant of the men his brother had entrusted to him.
The survivors had beached well away from the camp of
Demetrius' soldiers and soon made their way to Lysimachus'
headquarters. Lysimachus had hoped for much greater
reinforcements than these few and more than this the adventures
of Pleistarchus showed communications with Thrace were completely
blocked by Demetrius' men. Even the arrival of Seleucus could not
deflect from the vulnerability of the coalition army now it was
to all intents and purposes cut off from Europe. A situation that
was soon common knowledge in the army and led to mounting
desertions. Some hundreds of Lycians and Pamphyllians slipped
away to the Antigonids who had of course ruled their homelands
for many years. More significant was a group of 2,000 'barbarian'
auxiliaries
who were originally from far off Illyria and had been planted on
the borders of Macedonia and Thrace for almost a decade. These
were the Autariatae, who had lost their baggage to Demetrius on
the Hellespont. Clearly the prospect of regaining it by joining
what looked like the winning side was stronger than any sense of
loyalty to Cassander who had found them a new home. (11)
During the winter of 302/301 both Lysimachus and Seleucus must have had some inkling of what an epochal year was about to unfold. Four kings, three of whom had commanded under Alexander, were set to force a decision in the interminable wars that had followed the conqueror's death. Soldiers were in arms from as far west as Illyria and Epirus, from as far east as Bactria and Sogdia while between them the armies fielded half a thousand elephants that had begun life in the valleys of the Indus and Ganges. That the allied army had rendevoused successfully, apart from Pleistarchus' mishaps, had been extraordinary enough but that was but a prologue. What exact plans were made by Lysimachus and his allies in the comfort of Heraclea are unknown, but it is clear they were set on an immediate offensive to bring on a decisive encounter. Lysimachus was technically in command but, with great officers like Seleucus, Prepelaus and Pleistarchus at the head of their own units, his real task was in co-ordinating a committee of equal partners. To sustain unity would be difficult and the longer the campaign lasted the more opportunity there would be for fractures in their joint purpose. As with the leaders so with the men, warriors whose homelands were thousands of miles distant from each other and who had not fought together before were likely to find much to quarrel about if the campaign proved protracted.
When spring was so advanced that the mountain passes were clear the allied army marched south out of the valleys of Bithynia up the rim of the Anatolian plateau and onto the rolling steppe of what is now west central Turkey. The route they took is not recorded but they may well have followed the road through Dorylaeum where 1,500 years later the first Crusaders would win through in their initial battle with the Turks. The strategy was risky, the soldiers would have a long march before encountering the enemy in his own backyard where defeat might mean annihilation. In the same country, the year before, Lysimachus had retreated from Antigonus but now strongly reinforced he was in a position to face him in open battle.
Antigonus awaited the arrival of the enemy; he also welcomed a decisive contest. The king who had eluded him in the previous year may have been reinforced but so, too, had he. Demetrius had joined him at winter camp with the bulk of his army, leaving only garrisons to hold the main crossings to Europe. The two Antigonid monarchs mobilised their armies in preparation while they waited for firm news of the enemies movement so they could march to intercept them. Ipsus, where the final clash occurred, was about 50 miles north east of Synnada and Lysimachus had directed his march to threaten Antigonus' communication to the east and so draw him into a fight. This manoeuvre against the road back to the Levant was a persuasive factor for the old king. He would, by now, have known of Ptolemy's abortive invasion of Coele Syria in the previous year and a return by the Egyptian satrap and threat to Antigonia was almost certain.
There are stories in Plutarch that suggests Antigonus had premonitions of disaster that affected his confidence but these can be dismissed as examples of dramatic hindsight. Nothing in his actions suggests a failure of confidence. The old man had marched from Syria to Anatolia while Demetrius had conquered from Greece to the Hellespont. Antigonus, at eighty, intended to lead his army as of old. He and his son had confidence in the number and quality of their forces and planned to take the tactical offensive once the battle unfolded. The Antigonid army was almost as large as the one they had led against Egypt and most were seasoned veterans. Macedonian phalangites and the best mercenaries money could hire were at its heart. They also had excellent light infantry from Anatolia and unit after unit of aristocratic horsemen drawn from half the Hellenistic world.
The great misfortune of this, the most important and decisive of all the successors' battles, is the paucity of information available. Plutarch, in his life of Demetrius, gives the only coherent account and this just relating to the part played by the hero of his story. Diodorus remains in the tiniest of fragments for the battle which is particularly unfortunate as the whole account based on Hieronymus would have undoubtedly answered many questions that now can only be guessed at. Little enough is known of the site of the battle except that it was a wide open plain, a vast arena where these two huge armies could manoeuvre unrestricted. Antigonus needed an open site where his cavalry could be brought into play and, in turn, the allied kings could only effectively utilise their elephants on level ground.
Something is known of the general disposition particularly on the Antigonid side. 70,000 infantry were deployed conventionally in the centre of the battle-line. Perhaps as many as two thirds would have been armoured pikemen of the phalanx while the light armed men guarded the elephants and provided the flexible connection with the cavalry on the flanks. Here, protected by his bodyguard, Antigonus the one eyed stationed himself, the greatest warrior of the age whose life stretched back to a past that was almost legend to the young men in his army. Between the two wings 10,000 cavalry were divided, with the greatest number and best quality on the right flank under Demetrius. And, distributed along the whole of the front were 75 elephants, whose role would be to try and counter the far greater number of beasts the enemy could deploy.
The tactical plan of the Antigonid kings was not innovative. The decisive blow was to be struck by the right wing, where it was anticipated the high morale and superior training of Demetrius' cavaliers would make short work of the largely Iranian horse facing them. These men were the traditional and in some cases hereditary descendants of Alexander's Companion cavalry who had always bowled over such opposition at the charge. The weaker left wing was only intended to hold its ground while the centre pushed inexorably forward until Demetrius and his victorious horse returned to take the enemy phalanx in the rear and complete the triumph. As a plan, it was not over-elaborate and Antigonus had good reason to expect it to work. Intricate tactical schemes and deceptive ruses were the necessary armoury of a general commanding an intrinsically weaker force but Antigonus was not in that position. His was an army under one commander that had, for the most part, been together for years, not a disparate alliance of strangers who had joined each other only a few months before.
The dispositions in the opposing camp are less clear but enough is known to draw a few conclusions. The allies fielded 64,000 foot, although over 20,000 must have been light infantry. Seleucus had brought that many over the mountains from the east and it is unlikely that more than a few of these were phalangites. In addition some of his allies infantry were also light troops. Thus, even if they deployed the remainder, perhaps 40,000 in the central phalanx, the allied kings were at a serious disadvantage numerically.
In cavalry, however, they outnumbered the Antigonids as altogether they fielded 15,000, of which 12,000 were Seleucus' Iranian cavaliers. They were divided evenly on either flank of the phalanx. As to the actual commands of the allied army we have only one meagre detail. Antiochus, the young untried son and heir of Seleucus, was in charge of the left wing. His presence is noted because he happened to be directly opposed to Demetrius. Where Seleucus, Lysimachus, Prepelaus and Pleistarchus were deployed is unrecorded.
What is an even greater mystery than the stations of the allied commanders is the positioning of over 400 elephants and over a 100 scythed chariots that had accompanied Seleucus in his epic march from the upper satrapies. The chariots are not mentioned at all in the battle but the elephants were to have a decisive influence on the outcome. A proportion of these were placed along the front of the battle-line to face the 75 Antigonid beasts, but whether all were thus used or hundreds kept in reserve is in many ways the key to understanding the outcome of the whole battle.
Few of those present can have ever seen so many human beings gathered in one place as the two armies dressed their ranks and moved slowly towards each other. There were the equivalent of the citizen populations of 40 fair sized towns gathered together on this dusty plain in Anatolia, almost 200,000 men. By the time Demetrius gave the order for his horsemen to advance the dust kicked up by the myriad of animals' hooves and human feet must have made visibility all but impossible. In this murk Antigonus' son had marked out where the elephants opposite him were placed and he carefully manoeuvred his units around them before leading a charge directly at the enemy horse under Antiochus. Squadron after squadron charged into the fight, eager to bring to bear their numbers and superior quality. They rode in the wedge formation that had been so effective for the cavalry of Alexander when they shattered the battlefront of Darius' Persian armies. Each unit had its commander leading at the point, able to manoeuvre easily on their officer's lead and effective as a spearpoint in cutting into the formations in front of them. The assault was pressed with such elan that Antiochus' men began to lose cohesion and think only of their own survival. Soon they were in flight, carrying the son of Seleucus along as he vainly tried to rally the routed formations. But Demetrius failed to keep his troopers in hand as they swept away in pursuit, an occurrence that was far from unusual in cavalry actions from ancient through to modern times.
In the crucial clash of the phalanxes in the centre the contest had begun with duels between the elephants. The great beasts fought tusk to tusk with their riders lunging at each other with pikes and their light infantry escorts attempting to hamstring the enemy animals while protecting their own charges. All merely a preliminary to the main clash of the two great lines of phalangites. The push of pike began and both sides held firm despite the carnage wreaked amongst the front ranks on both sides. Veterans now settled down to the process of jabbing and shoving by which they hoped to break up the opposition's formations.
Little had occurred on Antigonus’ left wing and it seemed that the outnumbered cavalry and elephants there were holding on as planned. Now was the moment for Demetrius' victorious troopers to return and charge the vulnerable flank and rear of the allied phalanx. Though they had gone further in pursuit than intended the young king had eventually managed to regain control of his men who were then far in the rear of the allied army. He realigned his squadrons and turned them about to return to the main battle but very soon found that his way was blocked. The enemy had drawn up 300 elephants in a great line across his path and his horsemen could not get through this cordon of beasts. The soldiers' mounts would not approach the elephants such was their fear of the smell and noise and an increasingly anxious Demetrius could not find a way round this living barrier.
The whole episode of the elephant manoeuvre at Ipsus has been the cause of much discussion and explanation, none of which is entirely satisfactory. The first question is where this number of beasts came from; it is unlikely they could have come from those already involved in the battle. To move elephants on this scale was difficult in any event and virtually impossible if they had to be withdrawn from the battle-line before the manoeuvre began. The only other alternative is that they were kept in reserve behind the main formations but this is a tactic never heard of before. And, if 300 animals had been held back, only a 100 or so would have been available to clash with Antigonus' 75.
However, it would support the proposition put forward by Tarn (12)that the whole issue on the allied left was a deliberate ploy in which Antiochus feigned retreat to ensure Demetrius was drawn away and his return blocked by elephants kept in hand for that very purpose. Attractive though this theory is, it is hard to believe that the allied kings would have countenanced such a gamble. A withdrawal of Antiochus' wing would have risked demoralising the whole army, particularly with the polyglot nature of the allied forces. Lysimachus' men and the Macedonians in the phalanx would have certainly suspected treachery and the morale of the whole army quickly crippled.
If it was not a premeditated strategy then this manoeuvre with the elephants was a piece of inspired improvisation that turned the battle. It bore the hallmark of a leader very familiar with the use of massed elephants and Seleucus is the only senior commander who fits this case. He had seen at first hand their use in large numbers in India. Perhaps his role was in charge of his elephants which were kept in hand until developments allowed their decisive use.
But, even allowing for all this, there is still the further question of why the mobile horsemen of Demetrius' squadrons could not avoid the cumbersome beasts who confronted them and find a way round their line. One suggestion (13) has been that behind the allied army was a wide valley out of which they had originally debouched to face their enemy in the plain. Demetrius would then have pursued Antiochus up the valley and on his return found this wide passage completely blocked by the elephants. They were spread thickly enough to prevent infiltration but over enough distance to completely close the mouth of the valley and the sides were too steep for Demetrius' horsemen to ride up and over.
These myriad explanations are possible, if improbable, but what does not ring true is the chess-like precision of the movements of men and animals that is so untypical of warfare at any time and especially in the ancient world. The most tenable solution is that the meagre sources have rationalised a much more confused conflict between the young Antigonid's cavalrymen and the allied forces including large numbers of Seleucus' elephants that by chance or adept manoeuvring managed to keep Demetrius from the battle between the phalanxes until it was too late. The result in any case was the same and disastrous for his father.
Initially, things had gone well for the octogenarian, his pikemen outnumbered the opposition and even without his son's assistance it appeared likely that his veteran infantry would win the day. Problems arose when the enemy moved round men to attack the Antigonid right exposed when Demetrius chased headlong after Antiochus' horsemen. They began to be harassed by horse archers and javelineers brought round from the enemies' right wing. These fired missiles into the packed ranks of Antigonus' phalanx and threatened to charge against their exposed side. Unnerving even for these hardy fighters, to the front they faced the enemy pikes whilst their right unshielded flank faced wounds from arrows and javelins against which they could not respond. Morale was inevitably affected and Antigonus looked desperately for the return of his son who could even then have saved the battle. With no sign of his arrival some of Antigonus' warriors began to go over to the enemy. Desertion became infectious and whole units disintegrated. Once begun, loss of cohesion was fatal to bodies of ancient infantry and extraordinarily difficult to reverse in a huge melee of tens of thousands of battling soldiers. Antigonus attempted to rally those he could reach but his efforts were undermined by the increasing number of enemy horse and foot who were firing volley after volley into his ranks. Many of these skirmishers were closing in on Antigonus, himself, his guards were falling around him and in the confusion the old man was eventually hit by several javelins. He finally succumbed to wounds inflicted by the spears of what were almost certainly Seleucus' troops, thus fulfilling the prophecy of the Chaldean astrologers that it would indeed be he who brought Antigonus' downfall. With the commander fallen, what fight was left in the phalanx evaporated and a total route ensued.
Demetrius witnessed the final disaster from too far to help and bitterly accepted defeat. He rode off with the few thousand cavalry that were still with him and some other remnants who joined on the way to Ephesus where he risked a respite. One of these refugees was Pyrrhus, the eighteen year old exiled king of Epirus, who had fought valiantly on the left wing. But, if some assets had been saved it would have been of little comfort for filial Demetrius when during the retreat he received news that Antigonus had neither escaped nor surrendered but died on the field of battle.
At last, this octogenarian who had been a contemporary of Philip II was a corpse; the last of a generation. Few other examples can exist of a man of whom virtually nothing is known until he reached his fifties but who then set the world on fire for over twenty years by explosive energy and ambition. Since overcoming Eumenes, his power had been at the hub of the Hellenistic world constellation; whether the stars within in it were pulled towards his centre of strength or forced apart by fear of it.
Full of contradictions; he was vain enough to kill a man who ridiculed his missing eye, noted for arrogance and a failure to consider the advice and weaknesses of his followers. Yet, he could laugh at the sycophants who littered his headquarters and enjoyed a home-life that in no way suggested megalomania. He was apparently a faithful husband (14), whose domestic arrangements never brought down the kind of troubles that the courts of Ptolemy and Lysimachus experienced. The close and trusting relationship he had with Demetrius was legend.
The first Antigonid led the way in so many things. First to set a trend to kingship, the first to fully milk the propaganda benefits of claiming the title of defender of Greek autonomy. A cynical ploy that would reverberate down the days to the consul Flamininus, who brought the power of Rome into Greece and beyond. And, he alone, after Perdiccas, held out the promise and had the ambition to regain the entirety of Alexander's empire. A warrior all his life; since Philip turned his class into a purely military elite, Alexander made him and his peers the most successful soldiers and powerful rulers in the world. So when he was able to express his own aspirations it was hardly a surprise they came in imperial form. The most aggressive of the successors his response to the invasion of Lysimachus was the hallmark of a man not dulled even by advanced old age. Antigonus had answered the challenge by mobilising the whole resources of his new kingdom and gambled everything on a final reckoning. So, it was perhaps appropriate that a dynast who had spilled so much blood to achieve what he had should end his life in the midst of battle.
Everything about Antigonus' final defeat leads us to see it as epochal. It came chronologically almost at the turn of a century and is the point where the one detailed dependable source runs out so all that comes after is seen through a different and fractured lens. But common sense should give us pause. In his eighties, if he had drawn or even won the day, he could not have reasonably expected to have time to build on the achievement. Even with defeat his efforts were far from completely wiped out at Ipsus. Demetrius would hold up his family's claims for great power status through the sinews of naval might he had inherited from his father. Then, Antigonus Gonatus, the grandson, would fight his way to the throne of Macedonia, itself, from a base in Greece established in the old man's day.
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NOTES
1.Plutarch;Phocion 29.
2.Diodorus 20.106.2.
3.See Note 33 in The Rise of Antigonus.
4.Simpson 1957 (2).
5.Lysimachus also recruited Docimus' personal eunuch, Philetairos the later treasurer and founder of Pergamum. At some point during Docimus' rollercoaster career(whether before or after Ipsus is unknown)he founded a town called Docimeium, a place later renowned for its red veined marble-called by the local inhabitants docimite-much prized by the Romans.
6. His nephew and namesake-who had fought at Gabene-only escaped the same fate by virtue of a warning from his close friend Demetrius to flee for his life from Antigonus' court. He later founded the powerful kingdom of Pontus.
7.Plutarch;Demetrius 28.
8.Diodorus 20.109.1.
9.Most commentators assume Seleucus wintered in Cappadocia on the basis of Diodorus 20.113.4.Whilst this is possible, it seems to us that Seleucus having already come so far would have wanted to join Lysimachus for the winter and avert the possibility of Antigonus picking them off singly in a surprise attack.
A lesser, if related, problem is when Prepelaus joined Lysimachus. There is no mention in the sources but pace Billows 1990 p.177 it was probably at Synnada.
10.Dionysius had allied himself to Antigonus by marriage of his daughter to Ptolemaeus(see Stalemate).He had also fought under Antigonus in Cyprus.
11.Polynaeus 4.12.7 suggests that Lysimachus massacred 5,000 Autariatae immediately after the loss of the baggage train, which raises the problem of how the 2,000 who deserted survived. For discussion of the historicity of this incident see Billows 1990 p 180 and now Lund 1992 p 76ff.
12.Tarn 1930 p 69ff.
13.Bar-Kochva 1976.
14.Athenaeus Deipnosophistae XIII 578 B refers to a mistress of Demetrius with whom Antigonus fell in love with, but it is generally assumed that this anecdote refers to Antigonus Gonatus.